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Abstract   
The objective of the paper was to empirically investigate the validity of the beneficial grease hypothesis of 
public sector corruption with particular reference to Nigeria over the period 1981-2012. The study employed a 
multiple regression Ordinary Least Square methodology and the Johansen framework on secondary data to 
examine the nature of relationships between public sector corruption and five developmental explanatory 
variables. The empirical results confirm the existence of cointegration between public sector corruption and the 
identified variables. The results of causality tests indicate that public sector corruption does not Granger cause 
Gross Domestic Product and consequently Nigeria’s development. There is bidirectional causality from total 
expenditure to public sector corruption, while capital expenditure and foreign private investment Granger cause 
public sector corruption. The estimated regression results indicate that unemployment is positively related to 
public sector corruption while public sector corruption and GDP are inversely related; there is a strong inverse 
relationship between public sector corruption and foreign debt; capital expenditure and public sector corruption 
are positively related. The CUSUM and CUSUMQ results show the constancy of estimated parameters in the 
study period. The policy implication is that unless and until corruption is stamped out in Nigeria’s public life, 
promoting the country’s economic development, reducing unemployment and achieving a high standard of living 
among the people are not likely to be achieved. The conclusion is that the beneficial grease theory is not 
applicable to Nigeria and public sector corruption must be seriously addressed with the aim of eradicating it. 
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1. Introduction 
Public sector corruption has spanned many centuries of human history. As nations became established and 
civilized, it became obvious that the rulers, the powerful and the wealthy maintained and increased their power 
and wealth using the labour and resources of the less powerful. Massive exploitation, denial of rights, 
enslavement, extortion and many other forms of public sector malpractices characterized the early civilizations 
of ancient Egypt, Sumer in the Middle East, and the Indus valley of what is now India (Encarta, 2004). Despite 
this development, the nations of the world generally developed to the present globalised world, while ample 
evidence suggests that in both the long and short run, corruption is detrimental to economic development.  
Two popular socio-economic schools of thoughts on public sector corruption have evolved over the years. One 
school argues that public sector corruption does not harm economic growth and development but rather serves as 
lubricating grease that oils the wheels of the economy and commerce, and the socio-political setup. This school 
believes corruption greases the rusty and squeaky wheels of growth and development. Contrariwise, the other 
school insists that corruption is inimical to growth and development; and as a norm, does not develop a nation 
but harms its growth and development.  
This study concentrates on Nigeria, a country blessed with numerous natural resources and abundant manpower 
but which is yet noted for massive poverty and very high public sector corruption. Corruption has moved from 
the simple stealing of the 1970s to the embezzlement of public funds of the 1980s, the grand corruption of the 
1990s and the present day looting of the 2000s (Akinlabi et al, 2011). Nigeria has been vulnerable to official 
venality. Ranked by Transparency International (TI) as the most corrupt nation on planet earth in 1995, 1996 and 
1997, for close to two decades from then till now, the country has been among the 10 most corrupt nations in the 
world.      
The paper empiricaly tests the validity and veracity of the beneficial grease hypothesis of public sector 
corruption in economic development. The paper is organized into 5 sections. Following the introduction, Section 
2 deals with conceptual and empirical literature. Section 3 encompasses the methodology employed in the study. 
Results and discussion are covered in Section 4. The paper is concluded in Section 5.    
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 The Concept of Public Sector Corruption 
There is no universally accepted definition of corruption. This is so because what is regarded as corruption 
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depends on the nations, the actors, the profiteers and the initiators. It also depends on the existing laws and 
regulations guiding certain actions. Some countries define corruption in the broadest form while others legislate 
on the narrow definition of the term. The social and cultural context and the time dimensions also make a 
generally accepted definition difficult.  
Perhaps, because public sector corruption occurs most often in the government bureaucratic structure, Barro 
(1991) refers to public sector corruption as bureaucratic inefficiency. Of course, bureaucratic corruption may be 
very high and predominant in many developing countries; it is not the only area where corruption thrives in the 
public sector. Other areas like the judiciary may equally be very corrupt. It is in realization of this shortcoming 
that North (1990) posits that public sector corruption is synonymous to a general malfunctioning of government 
institutions. 
Obuah (2010) opines that any action of a public figure that is morally reprehensible is corruption. According to 
the World Bank (1997), corruption is “the abuse of public power for private benefit”. The Transparency 
International (1996) agrees with this and asserts that corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain”. Both organizations are specific on public sector corruption, i.e. the activities of those in government and 
other positions held in trust for the people that deviate from expectations. The problem here is that of 
identification of acts of corruption in a dynamic world. 
To specify acts that can clearly identify (public sector) corruption, the United Nations (2002) has adopted a 
descriptive approach that clearly highlighted bribery, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, abuse of office, 
laundering of proceeds of corruption, obstruction of justice, etc as corrupt acts. The specificity of corrupt acts in 
the United Nation’s definition is, however diverse, is still limited in scope and hence the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission (ICPC) Act (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2000) just illustrates what corruption is by 
naming two acts and giving room for more of such actions,  that is “ bribery, fraud and other related offences”. 
There is still the danger of being vague and illimitable, and this can be abused. 
To avoid the problem of erroneous limitation of obviously corrupt acts and yet granting clear description of what 
corruption is, the Vision 2010 Committee defines corruption as “all those improper actions or transactions aimed 
at changing the normal course of events, judgments and position of trust”.      
In this paper therefore, the term ‘corruption’ and ‘public sector corruption’ are used synonymously. An act is 
public sector corrupt when the motivation for it is to take undue advantage of the position of trust and is limited 
to pecuniary issues in this study. This is because one is interested in positive and a metric approach to public 
sector corruption. To make the analysis traceable in Nigerian context, public sector corruption is perceived 
broadly as the use of a local government, state government or federal government position or office for personal 
or private pecuniary gain. 
2.2 Theories of Public Sector Corruption and Development 
There are many theories that relate to corruption and economic growth and development in the literature. For 
simplicity, they are divided into three variants: the beneficial grease hypothesis, the anti-beneficial grease 
theories and the corruption-poverty nexus theory. 
2.2.1 The beneficial grease hypothesis  
This hypothesis is also called the ‘virtuous bribery story’ (Wei, 1998).  Kaufmann and Pablo (1999) nick-name it 
‘speed money argument’ and call its proponents ‘corruption apologists’. The hypothesis postulates that 
corruption is not inconsistent with development but can even foster it. It asserts that corruption of all types and 
forms can make positive contributions to economic and political development of an economy. The theory asserts 
that bribes often work as ‘grease’ on the wheels of commerce when bureaucratic bottlenecks constitute a 
stumbling block to efficiency in commerce and industry. 
Some of the pioneering works on this theory come from Myrdal (1968), Leff (1970) and Becker and Maher 
(1986). In support of the grease theory, Leff (1970) asserts that “corruption can be like grease, speeding up the 
wheels of commerce”. Citing practical example, he asserts that “if corruption does slow down economic 
development, East Asia must be an exception because while the region seems corrupt, it is able to attract lots of 
foreign investment and generate growth”. 
Mydal (1968) argues that corruption can make positive contributions to the development of an economy 
especially when it serves as a deliberate tool against administrative delay (which attracts more bribes) and so a 
lubricant to a sluggish economy. Agreeing with this viewpoint, Liu (1985) points out that corruption minimizes 
average time costs of waiting for public sector services that may come, but usually very late. 
Merton (1958) opines that “corruption in the form of nepotism, spoils and graft serve political functions of 
unification and stability” especially to developing countries, where powerful and influential individuals can be 
bribed to avoid catastrophes like inter-tribal and regional wars and sectional militancy like the Boko-Haram in 
North Eastern Nigeria and the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in South-South Nigeria. 
He argues further that corruption could facilitate efficient allocation of scarce resources because it could be a 
cheap way of distributing national resources among politicians and across regions within the country. 
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Viewing corruption through the eyes of a perfect competitive market, Becker and Maher (1986) maintain that 
corruption could be used as a tool for competitive bidding for the allocation of licenses to entrepreneurs who 
offer the highest amount of bribes. With sectors like petroleum where the optimum value is not known and 
corruption has beleaguered so much that the net value of the sector is not exactly known, bidding based on 
corruption could achieve market optimum. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) strongly support this argument and 
contend that the grease theory in practice would allow the private sector to buy their way out of the inefficiencies 
that public political officers would have introduced. 
Closely linked to the above is the Revisionist School of Corruption which argues that though corruption may 
appear evil and bad, it is an integral epoch in development and inevitable in developing countries because it is 
part of their social norms, values and practices of pre-colonial societies (Burns, 1960; Scott, 1965). According to 
Bayley (1966), “the man who in many non-Western countries is corrupt is not condemned at all by his own 
society ...” By implication, the revisionist school accepts the unavoidable episode of corruption at certain stages 
of development, and acknowledges the contributions of the practice and process to modernization and 
development. 
2.3 Anti-Grease Theories 
Contrary to the grease hypothesis, there are many theories that demonstrate that public sector corruption does not 
lead to growth and development. The Moralist Approach of the Western Liberal Perspective recognizes 
corruption and indiscipline as an immoral activity which is inimical to health, survival and progress of the 
society (Diwivedi, 1967).  This school attributes the causes of corruption to factors like moral laxity, lack of 
common standard of morality, and growing cultural and religious decay.  
Closely linked to the above is the perspective that corruption is a cultural and customary activity. Customs that 
are favourably disposed to gifts fall prey to public sector corruption as the line of division between bribe and gift 
is often ignored or absent as the citizenry deals with the highly placed public sector officials (Wei, 1998). 
Osborne (1997) argues that no culture celebrates corruption or dishonesty and that throughout human history, 
expressions of distaste for corruption and dishonesty exist generally, and that the existence of a culture of 
corruption looks foreign to most human cultures. The reason for the general distaste is that it profits nobody in 
the long run. 
Pasuk and Sungsidh (1994) in a study on Thai people agree that there may be no culture of corruption anywhere 
in the world but that some cultures have a higher limit on the amount of money officials may take from the 
private sector before it is considered as corruption. In this regard, Wei (1998) disagrees that many of these 
differences may not be inherently cultural but the greater “tolerance of bribes in some communities may be a 
result of the short horizons of the official due to uncertainty about the future in a time of rapid change”.   
Obuah (2010) believes the cultural corruption argument is misleading especially when daily experiences show 
that public sector corruption is uncommon in traditional African societies while those involved in corrupt 
activities in the modernized African setting are mostly the well-educated people, trained in Western tradition and 
strangers to the traditional African culture.  
Another anti-grease theory is the Marxist School of thought which dismisses the other approaches as superficial; 
that corruption is determined primarily by the prevailing social relations of production; that the mode of 
production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general (Marx, 1847). In 
Nigeria, the people in government and political offices constitute a homogenous group that controls the national 
resources, live above the law and are ‘first among equals’. The rest of the people are left uncared for and to 
languish in abject penury, hence the pervasive corruption and poverty in the country. The Marxist Perspective 
clearly identifies a key consequence of corruption as poverty.  
Corruption as an elite activity proposition is popularized by the African Centre for Economic Growth (2000). 
The centre clearly shows the connections and involvements of the elite in corruption, particularly in Africa. The 
economies of many African countries have governance institutions that are designed to be weak such as the 
parliament, the judiciary, the civil service and the police. With mass ignorance on the effects of corruption on the 
general economy, many African elites celebrate ill-gotten wealth. The proposition clearly distastes corruption 
and calls for a re-orientation of the educational systems in Africa.    
The Rent Seeking Theory argues that too much government intervention in economic activities creates rent-
seeking opportunities. According to Klitgaard (1988), rent-seeking corrupt activities occur when a public officer 
has monopoly over goods or services and decides who receives what, when and how much. Obuah (2010) lists 
rent seeking activities in Nigeria to include (but not limited) to bribe taking for issuance of licenses and business 
permits, taxes on documents, taking bribes to obtain import licenses, and taking bribes to influence bids for 
privatization of state-owned enterprises or government contracts. The rent seeking activities have permeated 
near-monopoly organizations like Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) and the Local Government 
Education Department (LGED). Obuah (2010) asserts that rent-seeking activities of public officials can hurt 
innovative activities and thereby slow down technological development of a country. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
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also agree that rent-seeking activities can hamper growth, even more severely than reduced production.    
Finally, the institutional theory of corruption pioneered by Klitgaard (1988) and further developed by the UNDP 
(2004) asserts that Corruption (C) is a function of Monopoly (M), Discretion (D) and Accountability, i.e. C = M 
+ D – A. Corruption thrives where there is monopolistic power with an agent on what to produce, when and how 
much to produce, and for whom to produce. If however, the system insists on accountability, then this will be a 
check on corruption. To the Klitgaardian model, the UNDP (2004) added Integrity (I) and Transparency (T), i.e. 
Corruption (C) = Monopoly (M) + Discretion (D) – Accountability (A) + Integrity (I) + Transparency (T), i.e. C 
= (M + D) – (A + I + T). The theory recognizes the absolute odiousness of corruption and spells out the 
components that necessitate it in order to ensure that the monster is ruthlessly dealt with anywhere it is found. 
2.4 Theory of Corruption-Poverty Nexus 
The Theory of Corruption-Poverty Nexus attempts to show the transmission channel of public sector corruption 
in the economy. Its origin is not very precise but Kauffmann (1999) and Mauro (2002) are some of the chief 
proponents of this school of thought. Others like Chetwynd (2003), Lambsdorff, (2007) and The African Centre 
for Economic Growth (2000) support the theory and have used it extensively.  
The theory postulates that corruption affects poverty by first impacting economic growth factors, which in turn, 
impact poverty levels. Economic theory (Lambsdorff, 2007) and empirical evidence (Gupta et al, 1998) both 
demonstrate that there is a direct causal link between corruption and economic growth. The theory posits that 
corruption impedes economic growth in about six ways; through discouraging foreign and domestic investment, 
taxing and dampening entrepreneurship, lowering the quality of public infrastructure, decreasing tax revenues, 
diverting public talents into rent-seeking and distorting the composition of public expenditure. Through these 
avenues, increased public sector corruption reduces economic growth and increases inequality, thereby 
increasing poverty and reducing aggregate welfare (but not greasing the wheels of commerce). The figure below 
demonstrates this. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Economic Transmission Theory 
Source: Chetwynd (2003). 
This paper adopts the economic transmission theory as its theoretical framework and utilizes the above model to 
test the validity of the grease theory in Nigeria. 
2.5 Arguments against the Beneficial Grease Hypothesis   
The argument that bribery can be an efficient way of getting round burdensome, bureaucratic rules and 
inefficient legalisms in corrupt systems has been considered as fallacious. Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999) 
argue that public officers in corrupt setups have near-monopolistic powers and could create, multiply and 
interpret new or existing regulations to profiteer; subsequently, instead of ‘bribery greasing the squeaky wheels 
of a rigid administration, it becomes the fuel for the numerous and flexible regulations that ensure corruption 
feeds on itself’ and hinder genuine entrepreneurial efforts . 
The beneficial grease theory also asserts that bribes allow the forces of demand and supply to operate and 
equilibrate the economy efficiently as the highest bribe giver (who could win a bid) would be the firm with the 
lowest average cost. This reasoning is elegant but theoretically and practically plausible only in a close economy. 
In an open economy such as is operational in the modern world, this argument is defective as recipients of bribes 
tend to siphon the huge bribes to their foreign accounts in order to avoid anti-corruption scrutiny, thus 
constituting a major leakage in the system and impairing macroeconomic stability. In addition, the firm with the 
highest bribe and bidding capacity may not be associated with cost efficiency but poor, substandard quality of 
work. This explains the reasons for the numerous abandoned projects in countries with high public sector 
corruption indices. 
The corruption apologists assert that corruption, especially the public sector type saves time, i.e. the long 
unprofitable time that is required to follow due process and obtain permits and licenses. Elegant in theory, this 
argument is often frustrated in practice as some other persons strategic in the ‘process’ may willingly offer to 
slow the approval process in favour of rival firms, thus creating a chaotic and inimical business scenario 
(Stapenhurst & Kpundeh, 1999). 
Critical observations show that corruption in the form of bribery and rent-seeking results in misallocation of 
talents and resources, as persons of low acumen pursue (often corruptly) and occupy positions with potentials for 
lucrative graft who ordinarily would have occupied more  modest financially rewarding but productive 
occupations (Mauro, 2002). Besides, corrupt policy makers and bureaucrats often make poor technological 
decisions favouring white elephant projects and programmes with high potentials for bribery (not withstanding 
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their low social benefits). In addition, corruption slows down investment. According to Kaufmann et al (1999), 
corruption is capable of reducing the flow of foreign direct investment as the numerous corrupt payments 
constitute an additional tax on investment. 
2.6 Empirical Literature 
Most literature in Economics demonstrates that public sector corruption does not grease the wheels of national 
commerce but translates to poverty by impacting negatively on important economic variables like investment, 
tax revenue, and entrepreneurship. Mauro (2002) says it occurs through negatively impacting investment and 
entrepreneurship, distorting existing markets and undermining productivity. By these arguments, they puncture 
the grease hypothesis of corruption. 
The proponents of the grease theory argue that what constitutes corruption is not even clear as it varies from 
country to country and among cultures. What is corruption in the developed economies of the West may not be 
corruption in the developing and emerging economies of Africa, thus indicating the effect of the vaguely defined 
corruption on growth and development as ambiguous. This argument is myopic and misleading since we are 
interested in the effects, which undeniably exist, whether the definition is controversial or not. Like death, the 
definition of corruption may be controversial but the effect is certain and sure. 
Akinpelu (1983) and Nnoli (1980) disagree with the foundations of this school and argue that corruption is 
universal and does not depend on colonial backgrounds. They also prove in their separate studies that pre-
colonial societies did not encourage individualistic and materialistic tendencies and public sector corruption. 
Kaufman and Wei (1998) also oppose the grease theory strongly on empirical grounds. Using data obtained from 
a survey of 2400 firms in 58 countries, they assert that “evidence supports the idea of tailored harassment and 
endogenous obstacles, and thus reject the hypothesis of exogenous obstacles and beneficial grease”.  They 
however acknowledge the truth of the growth experienced by East Asia despite the stupendous corruption that 
ravaged that region especially in the 1980s and 1990s when the region witnessed very high economic growth. 
They recommend further studies to establish the technicalities of that growth. 
Tamen (2010) postulates that development is moral and ethical, and that corruption is immoral and unethical; 
and that ‘there is no morality in immorality’, and as a norm, corruption cannot result in development. It is in the 
light of this that Hindricks et al (1998) contend that the grease theory is true in only exceptional cases when very 
chaotic scenario, bad regulations and financial anarchy are taken as exogenous.      
International Labour Organizaton’s research conducted by Knack (1999), and in 3 separate researches by the 
World Bank, conducted by Kaufmann, Aart and Pablo (1999, 2000 & 2002) and Transparency International’s 
findings as contained in their annual CPI ratings in 2004 and 2005, show negative impacts of corruption on 
various economic variables like investment, growth, infrastructural development and tax, thus proving 
empirically that in the long run, corruption does not and cannot lead to development and poverty reduction as a 
norm. Some specific effects of corruption on development variables are hereunder reviewed.  
2.6.1 Corruption and economic growth  
Generally, economic literature shows an inverse correlation between aggregate economic growth and corruption. 
While Eastery (1993) observes that most countries with higher corruption experience less economic growth, 
Mauro (2002) affirms that the relationship between corruption and economic growth in particular is complex. 
Following Tanzi and Davodi (1997), the World Bank (2002) and Barro (1996), it is affirmed that corruption 
hinders economic growth by lowering the quality of public infrastructure, discourages foreign and domestic 
investments, taxes entrepreneurship, decreases tax revenue through rent seeking activities of tax officials, diverts 
talent into rent seeking and militia activities and distorts the composition of public expenditure. The findings of 
Tanzi and Davodi (1997) are consistent with the above views that corruption is inversely correlated with growth 
in GNP.  
Mauro (2002) used a composite of two corruption indices and multiple regression analyses with a sample of 106 
countries to show that high levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of investment as a share of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and with lower GDP growth per capita. Corruption discourages foreign and 
domestic investments. The World Bank (2000a) discovered that one out of every four businesses in Bulgaria 
failed because of this fact. Also in Latvia, 28% of the firms considered this factor as one of the most essential in 
their investment decisions. 
Lambsdorff (2001) categorized investment into domestic savings and net capital inflows. Using OLS regression 
results, he provides evidence that corruption negatively impacts capital accumulation by deterring capital 
imports. To explore causation, Lambsdorff decomposed the corruption index into several sub-indicators that 
investigate corruption through the lens of bureaucratic quality, civil liberty, government stability, and law and 
order. Only the law and order sub-indicator turned out to be important for attracting capital flows.  
Another World Bank (2000a) research on 22 developing nations suggests that higher levels of corruption reduce 
growth through decreased investment and output.  These propositions support the notion that high public sector 
corruption is associated with low economic growth and not that corruption greases the wheels of commerce and 
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grow the economy. 
2.6.2 Corruption and income inequality  
According to Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Krueger (1974), corruption widens the gap between the opportunistic 
fraudulent persons and places the rest of a population on a disadvantaged lower income group. Gupta et al (1998) 
agree that a case where there is public sector mass corruption, the income inequality is normally highly 
unacceptable.  
A World Bank study (2000b) using the Gini coefficients for income per capita (measures of income inequality) 
against the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International, discovers that lower levels of 
corruption were statistically associated with lower levels of income inequality (the simple correlation was 0.72). 
The research adds that closer examination of the links between corruption and inequality show that the cost of 
corruption falls particularly heavily on smaller firms. 
Gupta et al (1998) conducted cross-national regression analysis of 56 countries and discover that public sector 
corruption produces bias in tax systems and poor targeting of social programmes, thus enhancing income 
inequality. Specifically, higher corruption is associated with worsening of a country's corruption index by 2.5 
points on a scale of 10 and corresponds to an increase in the Gini coefficient (i.e. worsening inequality) of about 
4 points. By deduction, he concludes that it is corruption that increases inequality and not the reverse; that 
corruption tends to increase the inequality of factor ownership and that corruption increases income inequality by 
reducing progressivity of the tax system. 
Barro (1996) provides empirical evidence that corruption aggravates income inequality and shows that it is also 
associated with lower economic growth and hence poverty. In another study of 35 countries (mostly ECA 
countries), Karstedt (2001) hypothesizes that corruption supports, stabilizes and deepens inequality. Her two 
measures of corruption (Transparency International’s CPI and Bribery Propensity Index) were tested against 
measures of income distribution (as well as measures of power distance between elites and other ranks, and 
general trust). The results show that societies with high income inequality have high levels of corruption. The 
summary is obvious, that corruption hampers economic growth and boost income inequality. 
2.6.3 Corruption and foreign investment 
There is a consensus that foreign direct investment (FDI) has the capacity to increase production and efficiency 
through spillover and multiplier effects (World Bank, 1998). The extent of the spillover however depends on the 
economic, institutional and technological conditions in the recipient countries (Akinlabi et al, 2001). There are 
inherent wealth creation and poverty reduction powers in the inflow of FDI. 
A World Bank (1998) survey identifies public sector corruption (which was described as graft) as one of the 
main hindrances to foreign direct investment. Agreeing with this, Asideu (2006) used the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) technique and regressed Nigeria’s corruption on her foreign direct investment and discovered an inverse 
relationship. He explains that corruption interferes directly with the operations of foreign direct investment, 
hence the higher the corruption, the lower the foreign direct investment. Shleifer and Visny (1993) corroborate 
this conclusion through their study and conclude that corruption reduces the incentive for businesses to invest. 
Wei (1998), using cross sectional data of some Asian countries tested the relationship between corruption and 
the volume and composition of capital inflows into emerging markets and discovers a strong negative 
relationship between the variables. High corruption reduces both the quantity and quality of foreign investments. 
Kurtzman et al (2004) arrive at a similar conclusion when they used cross sectional data via correlation models 
and discover that high levels of corruption strongly correlate with low levels of FDI inflows. 
According to Mauro (2002), a corrupt country will achieve aggregate investment level that is about 5% less than 
a relatively uncorrupt country and lose about 0.5% growth in annual GDP. It is in this wise that Akinlabi et al 
(2011), using Granger causality test and OLS to investigate the causality and effects of corruption on FDI inflow 
in Nigeria between 1981 and 2010, discover an inverse relationship between FDI and corruption. Asideu (2006) 
arrived at the same result in a separate study. 
2.6.4 Corruption and other economic development indicators 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) carried out a systematic study on the effects of corruption on government finances 
and discover that corruption increases the size of public investment which is skewed away from operation and 
maintenance of public utilities (to new ones), and is tilted away from the socially beneficial sectors like health 
and education and reduces the productivity of public goods and the tax system of a country.  
Ogboru and Abimiku (2010) used OLS and regressed CPI of Nigeria on some development indicators and 
discover a negative relationship between corruption and employment, capital expenditure and general 
government expenditure. With the evidence, they conclude that when corruption exists in a country, efforts to 
increase employment in the form of increased general expenditure by the government, increased capital 
expenditure on basic infrastructure and whatever minimum improvement in employment generation results in a 
commensurate increase in the level of corruption. This perhaps, explains the growth (with corruption and) 
without poverty reduction witnessed in Nigeria over the past decades.  
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3. Methodology  
3.1 Sources of Data  
Annual data covering the period 1981-2011 was utilized. The data was gathered from various issues of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, Transparency International, National Bureau of Statistics, and the National Population 
Commission. Occasioned by the paucity of data, the corruption perception index (CPI) from 1981 to 1993 was 
obtained by a backward 3-year moving average. All the variables employed in the study were converted to 
logarithms in order to capture nonlinear properties. All the computations were carried out using Eviews7.1 
package. 
3.2 Model Specification and Estimation Procedure 
The determinants of public sector corruption are extant in the literature. In order to evaluate the effects of public 
sector corruption on Nigeria’s economic development, a multiple regression framework within the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) methodology is adopted in which a linear equation is formed to show the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. OLS is particularly beneficial due to its properties of BLUE 
(Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) among the class of unbiased estimators, thereby rendering the results efficient 
and consistent. 
On the basis of the theoretical framework, the specification of the public sector corruption function is presented 
in equation 1: 
)1......(................................................................................loglog
loglogloglog  PSC Log
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where, 
PSC = Public Sector Corruption 
UNEMP = Unemployment Rate 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
DEBT = Debt Outstanding  
CAPEX = Capital expenditure  
TOTEXP = Total Expenditure  
FPI = Foreign Private Investment  
Public sector corruption was proxied by Corruption Perception Index (CPI) while the explanatory variables 
utilize five development indices as captured by the regressors in equation 1.  
A priori, the presumptive signs of the variables are:  
β
 1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 > 0, β 4 > 0, β5 > 0, β6 < 0 
The coefficient of unemployment is expected to be positively signed, agreeing with economic theory and 
implying that as public sector corruption increases, unemployment rate increases. GDP and public sector 
corruption are expected to have an inverse relationship, in that higher levels of public sector corruption reduces 
the rate of growth and consequently the development of a country. The coefficients of foreign debt stock, capital 
expenditure and total government expenditure are expected to be positively signed, consistent with economic 
theory and implying that increases in the variables lead to an increase in public sector corruption as the variables 
can provide the conduit through which corrupt practices are perpetrated. Foreign private investment is expected 
to have an indirect relationship with public sector corruption in that as corruption level worsens, less of foreign 
private investment is expected. 
In estimating equation 1, the following procedure was adopted. First the stochastic properties of the time series 
data used were examined to avoid the phenomenon of spurious regression. Consequently, a unit root test was 
carried out using three frameworks, viz the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), the Philips-Perron (PP) and the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), after which a test of cointegration among the identified variables 
was executed following the Johansen (1988) methodology. The choice of three unit root tests is underscored by 
the imperatives of consistency, comparison and robustness. The choice of the Johansen cointegration test is 
based on its superiority over the Engle-Granger methodology in that the latter is unsuitable for more than two 
variables and does not report more than one cointegrating vector. The test of cointegration was followed by the 
Granger Causality tests, after which the regression equation was estimated. Finally, a test of coefficient stability 
was conducted via the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares of 
recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ).  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The unit root tests are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Unit Root Test Results 
LEVEL 
 
Variable 
ADF  PP  KPSS 
Intercept Intercept and 
trend 
 Intercept Intercept 
and trend 
 Intercept Intercept 
and trend 
PSC -0.776411 -2.773044 
 
-0.472011 -2.651600 
 
0.636467** 0.157047** 
UNEMP 2.751697 1.064235 
 
2.845721 1.089767 
 
0.662836** 0.165824** 
GDP 4.449758* 3.764820** 
 
25.72148 15.64346 
 
0.580121** 0.184019** 
DEBT 1.075360 -1.904426 
 
-1.436235 -1.593076 
 
0.324984 0.093979 
TOTEXP 3.971964 0.303879 
 
4.246663 0.549246 
 
0.612483** 0.183605** 
CAPEX -0.650885 -1.613737 
 
-0.641720 -1.837582 
 
0.686345** 0.127474*** 
FPI 0.188427 -1.796164 
 
0.374342 -1.806993 
 
0.613075** 0.161384** 
 
FIRST DIFFERENCE 
PSC -6.284635* -6.259422* 
 
-7.726060* -10.28701* 
 
0.255876 0.377153 
UNEMP -0.090099 -0.827858 
 
-3.053465*** -3.966193** 
 
0.406887 0.124100 
GDP 0.712685 -1.269163 
 
-0.300127 -6.023063* 
 
0.692014 0.175208 
DEBT -5.415704* -4.431125** 
 
-3.220647** -3.084262 
 
0.115799 0.082487 
TOTEXP -3.337189** -5.588463* 
 
-3.245220** -5.619539* 
 
0.581667 0.089271 
CAPEX -5.506983* -5.434836* 
 
5.512296* -5.442120* 
 
0.130361 0.127967 
FPI -4.588542* -4.636517* 
 
-4.546604* -6.329904* 
 
0.215115 0.220955 
Note: *, ** and *** denote order of integration at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the ADF and PP tests, the 
null hypothesis is that the variable has a unit root, whereas for KPSS, the variable is stationary.  
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Results in Table 1 suggest that all the variables are non-stationary in levels. All three unit root tests lead to the 
same conclusion and are consistent. Consequently, a proof of cointegration among the variables implies that 
regression can proceed using the variables at levels without running the risk of spurious regresssion. Without 
cointegration, regression can be executed with the variables in their first difference.  
The results of the cointegraton test are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
  Hypothesis 
Null      Alternative             
Eigen 
value 
 λmax 
 
 5% critical 
value 
 λtrace  5% critical 
value 
r = 0 r ≥1  0.990037 
 
 124.4407* 
 
 46.23142 
 
 321.6976* 
 
 125.6154 
r ≤ 1 r ≥2  0.928859 
 
 71.36347* 
 
 40.07757 
 
 197.2569* 
 
 95.75366 
r ≤ 2 r ≥3  0.853877 
 
 51.92927* 
 
 33.87687 
 
 125.8934* 
 
 69.81889 
r ≤ 3 r ≥4  0.756449 
 
 38.13563* 
 
 27.58434 
 
 73.96415* 
 
 47.85613 
r ≤ 4 r ≥5  0.601652 
 
 24.85160* 
 
 21.13162 
 
 35.82852* 
 
 29.79707 
r ≤ 5 r ≥6  0.328025 
 
 10.73343 
 
 14.26460 
 
 10.97692 
 
 15.49471 
r ≤ 6 r ≥7  0.008978 
 
 0.243493 
 
 3.841466 
 
 0.243493 
 
 3.841466 
r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. *Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level of 
significance. 
Source: Authors’ computations  
Results in Table 2 indicate that there are five cointegrating vectors among the variables of interest based on both 
the maximal eigenvalues and trace test statistics. Thus, the hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables is 
rejected at the 5% significance level. Following the proof of cointegration among the non-stationary series, the 
estimation of multiple regression coefficients can proceed using the OLS framework.  
The results of the Granger Causality test are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Granger Causality Test Results 
Null Hypothesis F-statistics (P-value)   
1 Lag 2 Lags Decision  Conclusion 
(1) UNEMP & PSC 
UNEMP ↛ PSC 
PSC ↛ UNEMP 
1.32466 (0.2598) 
1.29027 (0.2660) 
 
0.59126 (0.5615) 
0.87123 (0.4313 ) 
 
Accept 
Accept 
 
 
Independent 
(2) GDP & PSC 
GDP ↛ PSC 
PSC ↛ GDP 
7.91847 (0.0092) 
0.63789 (0.4317) 
 
3.24342 (0.0574) 
0.75149 (0.4829) 
 
Reject 
Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
Granger Causality Test Results (continued) 
Null Hypothesis F-statistics (P-value)   
1 Lag 2 Lags Decision  Conclusion 
(3) DEBT & PSC 
DEBT ↛ PSC 
PSC ↛ DEBT 
0.62935 (0.4348) 
0.00786 (0.9300) 
 
2.47369 (0.1064 ) 
0.51687 (0.6031) 
 
Accept 
Accept 
 
 
Independent 
(4) CAPEX & PSC 
CAPEX ↛ PSC 
PSC ↛ CAPEX 
5.87827 (0.0223) 
0.60772 (0.4424) 
 
2.98764 (0.0694 ) 
0.47780 (0.6259 ) 
 
Reject 
Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(5) TOTEXP & PSC 
TOTEXP ↛ PSC 
PSC ↛ TOTEXP 
12.3157 (0.0017) 
3.17955 (0.0867) 
 
4.88377 (0.0176) 
3.20623 (0.0600 ) 
 
Reject 
Reject 
 
 
Bidirectional 
(6) FPI & PSC 
FPI ↛ PSC 
PSC ↛ FPI 
12.0212 (0.0018) 
1.83942 (0.1867) 
 
5.51252 (0.0111 ) 
1.88567 (0.1744) 
 
Reject 
Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(7) GDP & UNEMP 
GDP ↛ UNEMP  
UNEMP ↛ GDP 
7.37328 (0.0116) 
4.73128 (0.0389) 
 
3.30409 (0.0548 ) 
3.57526 (0.0445 ) 
 
Reject 
Reject 
 
 
Bidirectional 
(8) DEBT & UNEMP 
DEBT ↛ UNEMP 
UNEMP ↛ DEBT 
2.59174 (0.1195) 
0.45399 (0.5064) 
 
2.86144 (0.0777 ) 
0.64760 (0.5326 ) 
 
Reject Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(9) CAPEX & UNEMP 
CAPEX ↛ UNEMP  
UNEMP ↛ CAPEX 
0.00984 (0.9217) 
2.54042 (0.1226) 
 
0.00514 (0.9949 ) 
2.39254 (0.1129 ) 
 
Accept 
Accept 
 
 
Independent 
(10) TOTEXP & UNEMP 
TOTEXP ↛ UNEMP 
UNEMP ↛ TOTEXP 
5.97309 (0.0219) 
2.58086 (0.1207) 
 
2.48123 (0.1067 ) 
2.82839 (0.0807 ) 
 
Accept 
Reject 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(11) FPI & UNEMP 
FPI ↛ UNEMP 
UNEMP ↛ FPI 
16.5712 (0.0004) 
0.65278 (0.4265) 
 
9.19196 (0.0012 ) 
1.70394 (0.2041 ) 
 
Reject 
Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
Granger Causality Test Results (continued) 
Null Hypothesis F-statistics (P-value)   
1 Lag 2 Lags Decision  Conclusion 
(12) DEBT & GDP 
 DEBT ↛ GDP 
GDP ↛ DEBT 
0.39901 (0.5331) 
0.91535 (0.3475) 
 
9.86950 (0.0008 ) 
0.50192 (0.6118 ) 
 
Reject 
Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(13) CAPEX & GDP 
CAPEX ↛ GDP 
GDP ↛ CAPEX 
0.01017 (0.9205) 
0.05395 (0.8181) 
 
0.57612 (0.5700 ) 
0.67759 (0.5177 ) 
 
Accept 
Accept 
 
 
Independent 
(14) TOTEXP & GDP 
TOTEXP ↛ GDP 
GDP ↛ TOTEXP 
20.1207 (0.0001) 
0.10378 (0.7500) 
 
10.9275 (0.0005 ) 
0.46882 (0.6318 ) 
 
Reject 
Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(15) FPI & GDP 
FPI ↛ GDP 
GDP ↛ FPI 
8.88602 (0.0062) 
6.52506 (0.01680) 
 
10.2545 (0.0007 ) 
5.45484 (0.0115 ) 
 
Reject 
Reject 
 
 
Bidirectional 
(16) CAPEX & DEBT 
CAPEX ↛ DEBT 
 DEBT ↛ CAPEX 
0.42285 (0.5212) 
0.14244 (0.7089) 
 
2.29656 (0.1232 ) 
0.90593 (0.4181 ) 
 
Accept 
Accept 
 
Independent 
(17) TOTEXP & DEBT 
TOTEXP ↛ DEBT 
 DEBT ↛ TOTEXP 
0.85277 (0.3646) 
1.86983 (0.1837) 
 
0.04405 (0.9570 ) 
1.51308 (0.2423 ) 
 
Accept 
Accept 
 
 
Independent 
(18) FPI & DEBT 
FPI ↛ DEBT 
DEBT ↛ FPI 
0.02779 (0.8689) 
0.53358 (0.4716) 
 
0.14044 (0.8697 ) 
5.77566 (0.0093 ) 
 
Accept 
Reject 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(19) TOTEXP & CAPEX 
TOTEXP ↛ CAPEX 
CAPEX ↛ TOTEXP 
0.01141 (0.91580) 
2.46918 (0.12870) 
 
4.36229 (0.0254 ) 
1.34000 (0.2824 ) 
 
Reject 
Accept 
 
 
Unidirectional 
(20) FPI & CAPEX 
FPI ↛ CAPEX 
CAPEX ↛ FPI 
0.07606 (0.7849) 
2.23509 (0.1469) 
 
1.03816 (0.3701 ) 
1.19790 (0.3200) 
 
Accept 
Accept 
 
 
Independent 
Granger Causality Test Results (continued) 
Null Hypothesis F-statistics (P-value)   
1 Lag 2 Lags Decision  Conclusion 
(21) FPI & TOTEXP 
FPI ↛ TOTEXP 
TOTEXP ↛ FPI 
 0.43270 (0.5167) 
 8.14816 (0.00850) 
 
0.39195 (0.6804 ) 
8.34970 (0.0020 ) 
 
Accept   
Reject   
 
 
Unidirectional 
Note: ↛ denotes ‘does not Granger-cause’. 
Source: Authors’ computations  
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Results in Table 3 indicate that causality flows from GDP to public sector corruption, indicating that GDP 
Granger causes public sector corruption at the 1% level for 1 lag and 10% level for 2 lags. Thus, higher growth 
promotes public sector corruption in the Nigerian economy, while increased corruption is growth-damaging. 
While capital expenditure Granger causes public sector corruption at the 5% level for 1 lag and 10% level for 2 
lags, foreign private investment Granger causes public sector corruption at the 1% level for 1 lag and 5% level 
for 2 lags. The implication of these results is that capital expenditure and foreign private investments can be used 
to explain the level of public sector corruption in Nigeria. While debt Granger causes unemployment at the 10% 
level for 2 lags, there is independence of causality at 1 lag. At 1 lag, total expenditure Granger causes 
unemployment at the 5% level while for 2 lags, unemployment Granger causes total expenditure at the 10% 
level. Using both lags, it can be concluded that total debt outstanding and total government expenditure have a 
feedback relationship.  
A unidirectional causality exists from FPI to unemployment at the 1% level for both lags, implying that the 
nature of foreign private investment  in Nigeria can be used to explain the extent of unemployment in the 
country.  At 1 lag, debt Granger causes GDP while there is independence of causality at 2 lags. In addition, total 
expenditure Granger causes GDP at the 1% level in both lags. While foreign private investment and debt show 
independence of causality at 1 lag, there is however a flow of causality from debt to foreign private investment at 
the 1% significance level at 2 lags. In the same manner, total expenditure and capital expenditure  indicate 
independence of causality at 1 lag, and unidirectional causality from total expenditure to capital expenditure at 
the 5% level in the case of 2 lags. Moreover, there is flow of causality from total expenditure to foreign private 
investment at the 1% level for both lags. 
There is bidrectional causality flowing from total expenditure to public sector corruption and vice versa. The 
implication of this is that the level of total expenditure by government is helpful in predicting the level of public 
sector corruption in Nigeria. It is thus plausible to assert that the higher the level of total government spending, 
the higher is the level of public sector corruption. On the other hand, corruption level can help predict the nature 
and extent of total government spending in Nigeria. In essence, total spending has been helped more by the need 
to grease official kleptomania than by patriotic zest to improve the people’s living standards through 
employment generation, poverty reduction and the like.  
There is a feedback relationship between gross domestic product and unemployment. In other words, the higher 
the level of GDP in Nigeria, the higher is the level of unemployment and vice versa. The result is hardly 
surprising given that the major source of growth in the Nigerian economy is attributable to crude oil exploitation 
and sale and little if any from the real sector. It is known that the real sector of the economy exemplified by 
agriculture and industry have remained comatose for many years while the petroleum sector, which lacks the 
potential for mass employment due largely to its capital intensity has remained resilient. Furthermore, foreign 
private investment and GDP have bidirectional causality at the 5% level, implying that each can be reliably 
employed to predict the nature and direction of the other.  
From the causality results, there is independence of causality between unemployment and public sector 
corruption, debt and public sector corruption, capital expenditure and unemployment, capital expenditure and 
GDP, capital expenditure and debt, total expenditure and debt and between foreign private investment and 
capital expenditure. 
The regression results of equation 1 are presented in Table 4.  
Table 4. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: PSC 
  Variable                Coefficient            Standard Error        t-values (Prob.) 
CONSTANT  -8.501335* 2.427853 -3.501585 (0.0020) 
UNEMP 0.037351 0.186284 0.200504 (0.8429) 
GDP -0.248014 0.209801 -1.182138 (0.2498) 
DEBT -0.071985*** 0.036622 -1.965604 (0.0621) 
CAPEX 2.060050 1.341472 1.535664 (0.1389) 
TOTEXP 0.756855** 0.281672 2.687011 (0.0135) 
FPI 0.064446 0.128327 0.502200 (0.6205 ) 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R2 = 0.87; Adjusted R2= 0.83; F-stat = 23.61098 (0.000000); DW = 2.03; SER = 0.192250; JB = 2.817034 (0.244506); 
ARCH [χ2, 1] = 1.278668 (0.2581); RESET = 2.31E-06 (0.9988) 
Note:  *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Probability values are in 
brackets. DW: Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation; SER: Standard error of regression; ARCH: Engle’s test for conditional 
heteroskedasticity; JB: Jarque-Bera test for normality of residuals; RESET: Ramsey’s test for specification error.  
Source: Authors’ computations. 
From Table 4, the intercept term is correctly signed and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
implication of this is that in the absence of the regressors, public sector corruption can drop by as much as 850% 
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in Nigeria. It should be noted however that the interpretation of the intercept term in the context of the present 
study as in many econometric analyses is not very important.  
Unemployment is positively related to public sector corruption in Nigeria although it is not a statistically 
significant factor. The result is consistent with economic theory which posits that the higher the level of 
corruption, the higher will be the unemployment rate in an economy, ceteris paribus. Consequently, a decrease in 
the corruption level makes possible the chanelling of idle and underutilized resources into ventures that create 
employment. Thus, a cut in the level of corruption can be an avenue of making more resources available for 
investment and job creation in Nigeria. The result supports an earlier finding by Ogboru and Abimiku (2010), 
which indicates that for the Nigerian economy, a negative relationship exists between corruption and 
employment; in other words, there is a positive correlation between the level of corruption and unemployment.  
The results indicate that public sector corruption and GDP are inversely related. An increment in public sector 
corruption results in a reduced GDP annual growth rate. The implication of the result is that higher the level of 
corruption, the lower is the rate of growth of GDP and consequently the productivity and resourcefulness of the 
economy. This result is consistent with the findings of Eastery (1993), Tanzi and Davodi (1997), the World Bank 
(2002) and Barro (1996). That the result is so may not be unconnected with the nature and dynamics of 
corruption which hinders economic growth by lowering the quality of public infrastructure, discouraging foreign 
and domestic investment, and generally distorting public expenditure. It is not in contention that infrastructure 
like roads, railway, bridges and the like, all of which are important stimulants of long-term growth are in various 
degrees of neglect and decay in Nigeria. 
The results indicate a strong inverse relationship between public sector corruption and foreign debt. A priori, the 
expectation is that the coefficient of foreign debt should be positive, showing that a corrupt public sector 
encourages borrowing which makes money available for white elephant projects which offer opportunities for 
bribery and looting of public funds while leveraging other contraptions of corruption. Contrary to the a priori, the 
coefficient of -0.071985 which is statistically significant at the 10% level indicates that the higher the level of 
public sector corruption, the lower the foreign debt stock in Nigeria. The result is hardly surprising given that in 
the period under study and specifically in the late 1990s, a huge chunk of the country’s debts was forgiven by the 
World Bank and IMF. This may be responsible for the negative relationship in the estimated regression. In 
addition, the inverse relationship between debt stock and corruption can be situated within the context of 
international financial dynamics and is a reflection of the reaction of the international donor organizations to the 
external borrowings which finance projects for which contractors were fully paid but such contracts were either 
abandoned or never executed. As from the early 2000s, the international community refused to grant more loans 
to Nigeria (as the level and rate of public sector corruption increased). Thus, it is plausible to conclude that as the 
dynamics of public sector corruption worsened in Nigeria, the country was able to attract less and less of foreign 
debts, thereby buttressing the inverse relationship in the estimated model. 
The coefficient of capital expenditure of 1.341472 depicts a positive relationship between capital expenditure 
and public sector corruption. 1% increase in capital expenditure tends to be associated with 134% increase in the 
level of public sector corruption. The implication is that the higher the allocation for capital expenditure, the 
higher the level of public sector corruption. In Nigeria, capital investments are usually abandoned after full 
payments are collected by the contractor (who ‘silences’ the public officers by 10% kickback). Monies voted for 
the maintenance of existing infrastructure are diverted into personal accounts. Despite the activities of the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission 
(ICPC), the two main anti-corruption agencies in the country, the level and rate of embezzlement of monies for 
capital expenditures in Nigeria seems unabated.  
The result of the total expenditure coefficient is particularly interesting. The coefficient of 0.756855 and which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level indicates that an increase in government total expenditure of 1% results in 
about 76% increase in public sector corruption in Nigeria. The reasons for this are not far-fetched. It is known 
that once annual budgets are made public with its associated total expected expenditure, this gingers corrupt 
public officers who set in motion complex and integrated manipulations that ensure the maximum derivable 
‘benefits’, with the effect that the level of corruption increases commensurately with the ever increasing annual 
budgets. That annual budgets and corruption cases have consistently increased in Nigeria is well documented. 
This has been more exacerbated because the executive (constitutionally) is immune against litigation on corrupt 
charges while in office so that looting and bribery are officially administered and distributed. With increased 
contracts awarded occasioned by rising budgetary allocations, the engine of corruption is fuelled and lubricated.  
Results in Table 4 indicate that foreign private investment and public sector corruption are positively related, 
although the coefficient of  0.128327 is not statistically significant. Thus an increase in foreign private 
investment of 1% is associated with an increase in public sector corruption of 13%. That there is a positive 
relationship between the two variables is not out of place. A look at the amount of foreign direct investment in 
the Nigerian economy over the years shows an upward trend, although the scale and magnitude are far below 
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expectations, implying that some level of foreign private investment is still witnessed in the country especially in 
areas where returns are high and the cost of corruption can be defrayed (e.g. in petroluem, roads, bridges and 
other capital projects). 
The diagnostic statistics are quite satisfactory. The adjusted coefficient of determination (Adjusted R2) of 0.83 
indicates that 83% of the variation in public sector corruption in Nigeria is explained by the level of 
unemployment, gross domestic product, foreign debt outstanding, capital expenditure, total government 
expenditure and foreign private investment. The F-statistic is indicative of the joint significance of estimated 
coefficients. The Durbin-Watson (DW) Statistic of 2.03 signifies absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Jaque-Bera (JB) result of 2.817034 and its associated p-value of (0.244506) which is not statistically significant 
shows that the residuals in the estimated model are normally distributed. The ARCH test results accept the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. The Ramsey regression specification error test (RESET) is satisfactory and 
indicates that the estimated regression function does not suffer specification bias.  
4.1 Stability Tests  
To determine the stability of the regression coefficients, the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) 
and cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) tests were conducted. To establish that the 
parameters of the estimated function are stable, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are expected to stay 
within the 5% critical line. The choice of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests is informed by their relative 
superiority to the Chow test, the latter of which assumes a known structural break date, whereas for the former, 
no known date is assumed. It would be presumptuous for example to assume a particular break date in the series 
employed in the study, although intuitively, one may be guided by certain events such as the introduction of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as a possible break point. In any case, the employment of the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ framework makes such assumption needless.  
The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots are presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 2. Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals 
 
 
Figure 3. Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals 
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Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Source: Authors’ computations 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that except within the short range of 1994 to 1996 (for the CUSUMSQ), the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ plots do not cross the 5% critical lines. It is therefore concluded that the parameters for the 
estimated model are stable over the entire sample period. In other words, there is parameter constancy in the 
estimated model, and thus, the regression coefficients can be employed in policy recommendations. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The objective of the paper was the empirical examination and test of the validity and veracity of the beneficial 
grease hypothesis of public sector corruption in economic development with particular reference to Nigeria. To 
achieve this, the study employed the Johansen framework to examine the long-run relationships between public 
sector corruption (proxied by the Corruption Perception Index) and five explanatory variables. The empirical 
results confirm the existence of cointegration between public sector corruption and the identified variables. The 
estimated regression results indicate that unemployment is positively related to public sector corruption while 
public sector corruption and GDP are inversely related. In addition, there is a strong inverse relationship between 
public sector corruption and Foreign Debt. Capital expenditure and public sector corruption are positively 
related. A major finding is that there is a strong positive relationship between total government expenditure and 
public sector corruption in Nigeria. The results indicate that foreign private investment and public sector 
corruption are positively related.  
The results of causality tests indicate that there is bidirectional causality from total expenditure to public sector 
corruption, the implication being that the level of total expenditure by government is helpful in predicting the 
level of public sector corruption in Nigeria. There is also a feedback relationship between gross domestic product 
and unemployment. There is unidirectional causality between total government expenditure and public sector 
corruption, between GDP and unemployment and between foreign private investment and GDP. While capital 
expenditure Granger causes public sector corruption, FPI Granger causes public sector corruption, implying that 
capital expenditure and foreign private investment can be used to explain the level of public sector corruption in 
Nigeria. Total debt outstanding and total government expenditure also show a feedback relationship. There is 
independent causality between unemployment and public sector corruption, debt and public sector corruption, 
capital expenditure and unemployment, capital expenditure and GDP, capital expenditure and debt, total 
expenditure and debt and between foreign private investment and capital expenditure. The parameters for the 
estimated model show stability over the entire sample period as indicated by the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots.  
Although there may be examples of firms and individuals who are better off by the payment or receipt of a bribe 
or some other forms of corruption, it is clear from the empirical test on Nigerian data, that public sector 
corruption has a negative effect on Nigeria’s economic growth and development. It is therefore concluded that 
the beneficial grease hypothesis is not a reality in Nigeria. Consequently, corruption is harmful to the country 
and must be tackled from all dimensions if real growth and development are to be achieved.  
Based on the results of the study, it is recommended that anti-corruption agencies should be strengthened and 
empowered in order to carry on the fight against the pandemic. In addition, public expenditures must be 
streamlined towards raising productivity in the real sector of the economy in order to provide jobs and improve 
living standards. Furthermore, budget implementation must be given priority and adequate monitoring by the 
national and state assemblies should be ensured with a view to preventing non-implementation of projects which 
are a conduit of corruption in the country. On a final note, frivolous foreign debts should be discouraged through 
appropriate defence by government before the national and state assemblies on the reasons for their contraction 
while due monitoring is carried out to ensure that projects or programmes for which the debts are contracted are 
executed within reasonable time.  
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